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This study investigates the implications of risk premium shocks for aggregate
uctuations in a small open economy with nancial and informational frictions.
A dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework is developed, where the
informational asymmetries among the agents in the model and the uncertainty in
the production process necessitate nancial intermediation in the economy. The
Holmstrom-Tirole type of uncertainty in the production process also leads to
collateralized borrowing by rms, with the physical capital stock of rms serving
as the collateral as well as the factor of production. There is also a government
sector in the economy that borrows domestically with a partial default risk. In
order to compensate the lenders for the default risk included in the government
bonds, the government has to oer them some risk premium in addition to the
exogenously given world interest rate oered by the foreign bond issuers. It is
shown that, under certain circumstances, it is possible for the government to
reduce its debt and increase its spending in response to a positive, temporary
risk premium shock.
Keywords: default risk premium, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, aggre-
gate uctuations
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The implications of default risk premia for the business cycles in emerging economies
have started to arouse more interest among researchers over the last decade.1 One
strand of literature focuses on the eects of movements in domestic variables on coun-
try risk premia and documents that risk premia respond systematically and counter-
cyclically to the business cycles in emerging economies. 2 Another line of research
assumes that risk premia are exogenous to the domestic conditions in emerging coun-
tries. Authors advocating this argument relate the risk premium and the world interest
rate through some exogenous, stochastic process and attempt to partially explain ag-
gregate volatility in small open economies with interest rate uctuations. 3This study
proposes a theoretical framework incorporating nancial and informational frictions
as well as uncertainty to examine aggregate uctuations in response to risk premium
shocks in a small open economy.4 Financial frictions in the model are in the form
of restrictions on the composition of deposits held by the domestic nancial interme-
diaries in the economy. More specically, nancial intermediaries are assumed to be
able to hold no more than a certain fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits.
Informational asymmetries among the agents in the economy and uncertainty in the
production process necessitate nancial intermediation and require special attention to
the design of the loan contracts between the lenders (nancial intermediaries) and the
borrowers (rms) in the economy.
In this paper, a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE, henceforth) frame-
work with nancial and informational frictions is developed in order to analyze the
impact of risk premium shocks on a small open economy. In other words, aggregate
uctuations in response to risk premium shocks are investigated. It is shown that
positive, temporary risk premium shocks lead to an increase in domestic deposits,
loans, nominal exchange rate, tax rate and government spending, and a decrease in
consumption, output, labor supply, investment and government borrowing. There is a
cash-in-advance (CIA) framework, similar to that in Cogley and Nason (1994), modi-
ed in such a way that it includes nancial and informational frictions. The economy
consists of households, rms, foreign lenders, nancial intermediaries, the government,
the central bank and the nancial regulator. The government in the economy is as-
sumed to borrow domestically from the households with an endogenous partial default
risk. In order to compensate the households, that also have the options of depositing
at the nancial intermediaries or holding foreign bonds, for the risk involved in the
1See, among others, Arellano (2008).
2See, among others, Edwards (1984), Cline (1995), Cline and Barnes (1997) and Eichengreen and
Mody (2000).
3Neumeyer and Perri (2005) provide evidence for the fact that interest rate shocks constitute an
important factor for explaining business cycles in emerging economies.
4For a detailed analysis on the relationships between country risk premia, business cycles and
emerging market fundamentals, see Uribe and Yue (2006). Fuerst (1995), Gertler (1995), von Hagen
and Zhang (2008b) and Cakici (2012) investigate aggregate uctuations in the presence of nancial
frictions.
1government bonds, the government oers households some risk premium in addition
to the international interest rate prevailing for the foreign bond holdings.
Risk premium is, by denition, relevant for emerging economies that are exposed
to risks of default on debt due to their lack of adequately developed nancial and
macroeconomic infrastructure. Therefore, the implications of risk premium shocks for
aggregate uctuations are of special importance for emerging economies, that are also
facing nancial frictions. These two crucial aspects of emerging markets; namely, ex-
posure to default risk and nancial frictions, are combined in this study in a DSGE
framework with nancial intermediation.
The default risk has been modeled both exogenously and endogenously in several
dierent frameworks in the literature. Mendoza and Yue (2008) explain output dy-
namics around defaults, countercyclical spreads, high debt ratios and key business
cycle moments in a model with simultaneous default on public and private foreign
obligations. They attempt to propose a model that reconciles the business cycle mod-
els treating default risk exogenously and the sovereign default models treating output
uctuations exogenously. They develop a model of strategic sovereign default with
endogenous output dynamics and examine its quantitative predictions.5 Bi and Leeper
(2010) criticize the strategic default literature due to its inability to match the data.
More precisely, they argue that the default frequency is predicted by this literature
to be far too high and the level of debt at which default occurs far too low. They
propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, where the perceived riskiness
of government debt depends partly on the scal environment, to study the tradeos
between short-run scal stimulus and long-run sustainability.
The economy analyzed in this paper features nancial frictions restricting the
amount of foreign borrowing in the economy, informational asymmetries among the
agents in the economy, and imperfections of the Holmstrom-Tirole (1997) type of un-
certainty in the production process. Entrepreneurs that run the rms have two dier-
ent project choices for production, both of which are subject to idiosyncratic risk. The
projects yield positive output in the case of success and no output in the case of failure.
The projects dier according to their probabilities of success and the private benets
they provide to the entrepreneurs. It is those private benets that create incentives
for the managers of the rms, inducing them to act against the interest of their cred-
itors. The project choices of the entrepreneurs are private information, whereas the
project outcomes are veriable by the nancial intermediaries. Households and foreign
investors are assumed to lack the ability to verify the project outcomes. Therefore,
domestic and foreign investors prefer lending to rms indirectly, through nancial in-
termediaries, rather than directly.
5The strategic default literature has grown out of the papers by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and
Eaton et al. (1986). This strand of literature models default on external debt as an optimal and
strategic decision made by the government. See, among others, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) for a
recent study following this literature.
2Exploring the potential impact of nancial frictions on aggregate uctuations has
long been a topic of interest in the literature.6 Financial markets and institutions have
been considered to have signicant eects on aggregate economic activity. Financial
frictions are incorporated into the model here through the introduction of a regula-
tion in the economy that the nancial intermediaries can hold no more than a certain
fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits. The parameter representing this
fraction is assumed to be controlled by the nancial regulator in the economy.
As mentioned above, a DSGE framework with nancial intermediation and a gov-
ernment sector is developed in this study in order to analyze aggregate uctuations
in the case of risk premium shocks.7 As far as models with nancial intermediation
are concerned, there is a literature following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) designing the
loan contracts between borrowers and lenders with some durable asset, like land, as
collateral.8 In these models, lenders cannot force borrowers to repay debts unless those
debts are secured. In such a context, borrowers' assets like land serve both as factors
of production and as collateral for new loans. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) employ such
a framework in the dynamic equilibrium model they develop in order to analyze the
transmission mechanism in the case of temporary shocks. Kiyotaki and Moore show
that small, temporary shocks to technology or income distribution can generate large,
persistent uctuations in output and asset prices.9 Employing land as collateral, von
Hagen and Zhang (2008a) investigate the welfare implications of nancial liberalization
in a real, small open economy and suggest that nancial opening facilitates the inow
of cheap foreign funds and improves production eciency.
The loan contracts between the rms and the nancial intermediaries in the current
framework must be designed in such a way that the uncertainty involved in the pro-
duction process is taken into account. At this point, collateralized borrowing becomes
relevant here. However, in the current framework, it is the capital stock of the rms
that is suggested to be used as collateral by the rms in the case of failure of their
production projects. Therefore, the loan contract species the rate of interest on loans
that is going to be valid in the case of success and the fraction of the capital stock of
the rms to be handed over to the nancial intermediaries in the case of failure. In
this context, the output produced by the rms using capital and labor as inputs is the
return of the projects in the case of success. It is assumed that there is no output in
the case of failure. Due to this probability of zero output in the case of failure, rms
have to use their capital stock as collateral in order to be able to borrow loans from
nancial intermediaries.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the model
and presents the solution of the model that consists of the system of equations includ-
6See von Heideken (2009) for an analysis of the implications of nancial frictions for business cycles
in the US and the Euro Area.
7The framework developed here is based on the model in Cakici (2011).
8For more information on models with nancial intermediation, see Freixas and Rochet (1997).
9For a detailed analysis on the propagation of aggregate uctuations, see Bernanke et al. (1996).
3ing the rst-order conditions and the market-clearing conditions. The simulation of the
model and the impulse response functions are given in section 3. Finally, concluding
remarks are presented in section 4.
42 The Model
The model developed here is one of cash in advance (CIA), similar to the model em-
ployed by Cogley and Nason (1994), modied in a way so as to incorporate nancial
intermediation and a government sector. All decisions are made after, and therefore
completely reect, the current period surprise change in risk premium. For the timing
of the stock variables, like money and capital stock, "stock as of the end of the period"
convention is used. For instance, Mt denotes the money stock as of the end of period t,
that is to be transferred to period t+1, and Kt is the capital stock at the end of period
t. The economy consists of households, rms, foreign lenders, nancial intermediaries,
the government, the central bank and the nancial regulator.
Innitely-lived households, that are assumed to be the owners of the nancial inter-
mediaries, maximize their utility functions that depend on consumption, Ct, and hours
worked, Ht. They decide how much money to deposit at the bank, DDt, in order to
earn RHt   1 of net interest, how much government bonds, GBt, to hold at a gross
interest rate of RGB
t and how much foreign bonds, FBt, to hold in return for a gross
interest rate of R, how much to spend on consumption, and how much labor to supply
to the rms. At the beginning of each period, households receive their deposits from
the previous period plus the interest payment and make current-period deposits at the
nancial intermediaries. Additionally, they receive payments from the government and
the foreign bond issuers for their bond holdings from the previous period inclusive of
the interest payments and decide on bond holdings for the current period. They also
supply labor, earn wage income and decide how much consumption to make and how
much money to transfer to the next period.
Firms are owned by entrepreneurs, who have a nite but stochastic lifetime. Ev-
ery period, a certain mass of entrepreneurs receives the signal of death and leaves the
economy, whereas new entrepreneurs of equal mass enter the economy next period.
In the aggregate, the share of entrepreneurs in the society is constant. Entrepreneurs
maximize prots, Ft, by choosing next period's capital stock, Kt, labor demand, Nt,
and loans, Lt, they borrow from nancial intermediaries. At the beginning of every
period, the existing entrepreneurs in the economy pay back the loans they borrowed in
the previous period from the nancial intermediaries including the interest and borrow
new loans for the current period. Entrepreneurs then use these loans to hire labor for
production. The new entrants, on the other hand, are assumed to bring along some
initial wealth with which they can buy the capital stock they need for production from
the nancial intermediaries. There is Holmstrom-Tirole (1997) type of uncertainty in
the production process. Firms have two available project choices to produce goods,
both of which are subject to idiosyncratic risk; namely, they yield positive return in the
case of success and zero return in the case of failure. The projects dier according to
their probabilities of success, with pH in the case of project "good" and pL in the case
of project "bad". The reason why the entrepreneurs might have incentives to choose
project "bad" is that it yields some private benets, PB, to the entrepreneurs. Project
5"good" yields no private benets. It is assumed that the project outcomes can be
perfectly veried by the nancial intermediaries, which have the exclusive technology
to do so, while the project choices of the entrepreneurs are unobservable. Households
and foreign investors are assumed to lack the ability to verify the project outcomes.
It is this uncertainty that rationalizes the existence of nancial intermediation in the
economy.
Foreign investors prefer lending to the rms through the nancial intermediaries
instead of directly, also due to their limited familiarity with the domestic economy.
They are assumed to supply funds, FDt, innitely elastically at a constant interest
rate, R, that is lower than the domestic loan rate.
Financial intermediaries (FI henceforth) maximize the expected innite horizon dis-
counted stream of dividends, Bt, they pay to households. They receive cash deposits
from households, DDt, cash deposits from foreign investors, FDt, and cash injection,
Xt, from the central bank (which equals the net change in nominal money balances,
Mt  Mt 1). The FI then use these funds to give loans to rms. According to the loan
contract between the FI and the rms, the FI gain a net return of RFt 1 in the case of
success of the rms' projects and a certain fraction, , of the capital stock of the rms
in the case of failure. The FI are allowed to hold no more than a certain fraction of
their total deposits as foreign deposits. In other words, there is an upper limit on the
fraction of foreign deposits over total deposits to be held by the FI. At the beginning of
each period, nancial intermediaries receive the loans they lent to rms in the previous
period inclusive of the interest payments, sell out the capital stock they hold due to
the failure of the rms' projects in the previous period, and pay back the domestic
and foreign deposits they collected in the previous period together with the interest.
Additionally, they accept current-period deposits from households and foreign lenders
and give current-period loans to rms.
Finally, the government nances unproductive government purchases, Gt, through
collecting taxes and issuing one-period government bonds, GBt. It raises tax revenue
through a time-varying income tax, t. The government debt is denominated in foreign
currency and is subject to partial default risk. More specically, only with probabil-
ity pR
t , the government is able to repay its debt totally and with probability 1   pR
t ,
it can pay only a certain fraction of its debt, determined by the parameter , back
to the households. In order to compensate the households for the default risk of the
government bonds, the government has to oer some risk premium in addition to the
world interest rate prevailing for the foreign bond holdings. The risk premium is de-
termined partly by the exogenous risk premium shock and partly by the probability of
default by the government, which in turn depends on the value of the government debt.
62.1 Households






t[(1   )lnCt + ln(1   Ht)]
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;0 < ; < 1 (1)








t 1]. It is assumed that the money
stock transferred from previous period, labour income, interest income on previous-
period deposits net of current-period deposits, and interest income on previous-period
bond holdings net of current-period bond holdings are available for consumption pur-





and to the nonnegativity constraint
0  DDt (4)
where Pt and Wt denote the price level of the single consumption good and the
nominal wage rate, respectively. Bt refers to the dividends paid to households by
nancial intermediaries. RHt is the gross nominal interest rate on household deposits.
DDt is denominated in domestic currency whereas GBt is denominated in foreign
currency.
2.2 Firms
There is a certain mass of entrepreneurs in the population that runs the rms in the
economy. Each period,  percent of them dies and new entrants of an equal mass
are added to the population such that the size of the population remains the same.10
At the micro level, this means that, with probability , each entrepreneur receives a
signal every period that he will die at the end of the period. Entrepreneurs receiving
10This assumption is needed in order to be able to prevent the entrepreneurs from accumulating
too much prots that would invalidate the borrowing constraint of the rms. In the literature, part of
prots accumulated by the rms is, alternatively, distributed to the households, that are assumed to
own the rms, as dividends (see, among others, Feldstein and Green (1983)). However, in the current
context, there are informational asymmetries in the sense that households are not able to observe
rms' prots. Therefore, the assumption that rms are owned by households and that they distribute
part of their prots to households as dividends is not reasonable here.
7this signal consume everything that is left at the end of the period after paying back
the debt. The new entrants bring along some initial wealth with which they can
obtain the capital stock they need to start production. They buy this capital stock
from the nancial intermediaries, which receive capital stock as repayment of loans in
the case of failure of the rms' projects. Entrepreneurs, therefore, maximize prots
taking into account this probability of death. There is uncertainty involved in the
production process of the rm, resulting from the fact that the entrepreneur has two
available projects to produce the single consumption good11, both of which are subject
to idiosyncratic risk. More specically, the entrepreneur has two project choices that
dier according to their probabilities of success and the private benets they provide
to the entrepreneur, and there is positive output in the case of success of the projects
while there is no output in the case of failure. pH and pL denote the probabilities of
success of the "good" and the "bad" project, respectively, where 0 < pL < pH < 1.
The entrepreneur gets PB amount of private benets per capital stock if he chooses the
project "bad" whereas there is no private benet obtained from the project "good".
The entrepreneur's payos from the projects can be summarized as follows:
In the case of "good project":
pH[PtYt   RFtLt] + (1   pH)[0   (1   )Kt 1Pt]
In the case of "bad project":
pL[PtYt   RFtLt] + (1   pL)[0   (1   )Kt 1Pt] + PBKtPt




H(1   )RF;t 1Lt 1   (1   p
H)(1   )Kt 1Pt (5)
where  is the constant physical depreciation rate of capital. Given that the en-
trepreneur chooses the project "good" (which will be the case as long as the incentive
constraint stated below holds), with probability pH the rm is able to make use of the
loans it borrows from the FI to hire Nt amount of labor, which it can employ together
with the capital stock it has, Kt 1, to produce Yt amount of output. The entrepreneur
makes in this case an interest payment to the FI for the loans at the rate specied
in the loan contract, RFt. In the case of failure, there is no output produced and the
entrepreneur has to transfer a certain amount of its capital stock, which it used as
collateral in order to be able to borrow from the FI, to the FI.  represents the fraction
of the capital stock of the rm guaranteed in the loan contract to be handed over to
the FI in the case of failure. Due to the fact that capital stock is employed in the
production process and therefore subject to depreciation independent of the project
outcome of the rm, it is the net-of-depreciation amount of capital stock, the fraction
of which is to be handed over to the FI in the case of failure. The period t loans of the
11The consumption good and the capital good are assumed to be identical for analytical purposes.
8rm, Lt, and the period t wage payments, WtNt, cancel out above.





where At denotes technology, the shock process of which is a unit root with drift in
the log of technology, given as
lnAt =  + lnAt 1 + A;t; A;t  N(0;
2
A) (7)
The capital accumulation equation is given as
Kt = p
H[(1 )Kt 1+(1 )(It+(1 )Kt 1)]+(1 p
H)(1 )(1 )Kt 1; 0 <  < 1
(8)
Kt is the level of physical capital to be employed in the production process at time
t+1, determined by the entrepreneur at time t. Equation (8) is the capital accumula-
tion equation at the macro level in the sense that  represents here the mass, out of a
group of entrepreneurs, that dies each period, rather than the probability of death of a
single entrepreneur, as in the micro sense. Therefore, the rst term in the paranthesis
on the right-hand side of the equation, (1 )Kt 1, stands for the capital stock held
by the new entrants at the beginning of every period (recall the assumption that an
equal mass, , of new entrepreneurs enters the economy each period so that the total
size of the population remains unchanged). The second term represents the amount of
capital stock accumulated by the successful entrepreneurs continuing to live and pro-
duce; the net-of-depreciation amount of capital stock of the current period, (1 )Kt 1,
plus the amount of investment, It. Investment is equal to the real prots made by the
successful entrepreneurs in the economy. The last term on the right-hand side of the
equation gives the amount of the capital stock of the unsuccessful entrepreneurs that
cannot make positive real prots due to the fact that there is no output in the case of
failure of the rms' projects.
It might help to make the capital accumulation process more clear to rewrite the
prot and the capital accumulation functions from a micro perspective such that the
prot made and the capital stock accumulated are captured separately for the cases of






t ) denote the prot and
the capital stock, respectively, accumulated by a single entrepreneur in the case of suc-













H(1   ) + K
f
t (1   p
H) (10)
9The prots made in the case of success of the projects, which are invested, and




t = PtYt   RFtLt   (1   )RF;t 1Lt 1 (11)






t =Pt + (1   )Kt 1 (12)




t =  (1   )Kt 1Pt (13)





t =Pt + (1   )Kt 1 = (1   )(1   )Kt 1 (14)
Plugging equations (12) and (14) into equation (10), the capital accumulation equa-
tion given in equation (8) is obtained at the micro level.
Entrepreneurs' maximization problem is subject to the constraint reecting the fact
that the rm nances its wage payments with the loans it borrows from the FI. Hence,
it obeys
WtNt  Lt (15)
Finally, there is an incentive constraint for the rm to choose the project "good":




As long as this constraint holds, the entrepreneur maximizes prots given in equa-
tion (5) that is written for the case of project "good". The incentive constraint also
gives the borrowing constraint of the rm













In the standard collateralized borrowing literature, the maximum amount of loans
supplied to the rms by the FIs is determined according to the value of the collateral
10rms have. More precisely, the value of the loans the FIs supply does not exceed the
value of the collateral of the rms, which is exactly what the collateral constraints
imply. However, in those frameworks, the total supply of loans is often xed (limited).
Therefore, it is an optimal allocation problem of loans and assets (that are used as
collateral) among agents with diering productivities. In the current framework, the
total amount of loans available is determined in part stochastically, due to the fact
that it is the sum of total deposits and the monetary injection the FIs hold and that
the monetary injection is an exogenous stochastic process. As a result, the optimiza-
tion problem here has to do with the allocation of the incoming (injected) new loans
available to the FIs. In the standard CIA literature, where the total supply of loans is
subject to uncertainty similar to the framework here, the allocation problem of the new
loans is solved through the adjustment of the loan rate. To be more specic, as the
total supply of loans increase, the loan rate falls so that the rms continue to demand
the extra loans available, and the FIs continue to supply the extra loans to the rms as
long as their return (the loan rate) is positive. However, in those frameworks, there is
no uncertainty in the production process; therefore, there is no need for collateralized
borrowing. The major novelty of the framework in this paper is to reconcile these two
strands of literature with the motivation of analyzing aggregate uctuations in the case
of risk premium shocks for an economy with uncertainty and frictions.
For the FI to continue lending the new resources available as loans to rms, the
return on the loans must be positive and greater than the return on any outside option
of the FI; that is,
p




 RHt > 0 (19)
where RHt represents the return on the outside option of the FI, namely, lending
to other FIs.12 The parameters of the model are calibrated in such a way that the
inequality holds.





(1   pH)(1   )Kt 1Pt+1
(RHt   pHRFt)
(20)
The loan market equilibrium condition is obtained through equating the loan sup-
ply and the loan demand equations.
12The return on loans just has to be positive, once the assumption that FIs can lend to and borrow
from one another is relaxed.
112.3 Financial Intermediaries
The objective of the FI is to maximize the expected innite horizon discounted stream

















where FDt  0 is denominated in foreign currency and Et is the nominal exchange
rate (the domestic currency value of one unit of the foreign currency). Purchasing
power parity (PPP) holds so that Pt = EtP 
t , with P 
t denoting the foreign price level.
P 
t is normalized to 1; therefore, the uctuations in the exchange rate in response to
the shocks are captured by the movements in the domestic price level. The net present
value of future dividends is discounted by the marginal utility of consumption due to
the fact that nancial intermediaries are owned by households and that an extra unit
of dividend is valued by households to the extent that it enables future consumption.
The monetary injection, Xt, and the total deposits at the FI in period t, Dt, are used
by the FI for the period t loans, Lt; therefore, they cancel out in the budget constraint
of the FI.
Xt is the monetary injection during date t, Xt = Mt   Mt 1, dened similarly to
Nason and Cogley (1994).13
The exogenous stochastic process for the growth rate of the monetary injection is
given as
lnmt = (1   )lnm
 + lnmt 1 + M;t; M;t  N(0;
2
M) (23)
where mt = Mt
Mt 1.
It is therefore an autoregressive stationary process in the growth rate of money, but
an AR(2) with a unit root in the log of the level of money. This can be seen from the
denition of mt which can be rewritten as lnMt = lnMt 1 + lnmt.
The second constraint the FI faces, namely the balance sheet constraint, requires
that the liabilities of the FI are less than or equal to its assets
Dt + Xt  Lt (24)
13It can be seen from the households' budget constraint that Xt equals the total income of households
(labor income+interest on deposits+dividends from the nancial intermediaries) minus consumption,
which cannot be negative since households are assumed to transfer some cash to the next period.
12where Dt = DDt + FDtEt and FDtEt =  Dt, DDt = (1    )Dt.
  represents the nancial openness parameter assumed to be controlled by the -
nancial regulator and varies between 0 and 1. Higher levels of   imply higher degrees
of nancial integration.
2.4 Government
The government in the economy nances unproductive government purchases denomi-
nated in the consumption good, Gt, through raising tax revenues and issuing one-period
government bonds, GBt. Tax revenues are obtained by a time-varying at rate tax, t,
on labor income. Government bonds are denominated in foreign currency and govern-
ment debt is subject to a partial default risk, with an endogenous default probability
1   pR
t . To be more precise, probabilistically, the government might not be able to
repay its debt totally. The government budget constraint is then given as








t 1] + GtPt (25)
where pR
t is the probability with which the government will be able to repay its
debt totally and  denotes the percentage of the government debt to be repaid in the
case of default. RGB
t represents the gross nominal interest rate on government bonds,




 + RPt (26)
RPt stands for the "risk premium" that the government has to pay in addition to
the world interest rate, R*, in order to compensate the households, that also have the
option of holding foreign bonds, for the risk of default on the government debt. Risk
premium is determined partly by the probability of default by the government, 1 pR
t ,






+ RP;t; RP;t  N(0;
2
RP) (27)
where RP;t denotes the risk premium shock.
The probability of default, 1   pR
t , is a function of the value of the government
debt14:
14Alternative ways have been proposed in the literature to endogeneize default rates. Uribe (2006b),








The government also follows a simple tax rule, adjusting the tax rate in response






; 0 <  < 1 (29)
where  might be interpreted as the tax adjustment parameter.
2.5 System of Equations
In a stochastic setting, the solution of the model is not a series of numbers that match
a given set of equations, as in a deterministic setting. In a stochastic environment, the
best thing agents can do is to specify a decision, policy or feedback rule for the future,
in other words, their optimal actions contingent on each possible realization of shocks.
Therefore, it is a function satisfying the model's equilibrium conditions that is being
searched. The system of equations consists of the rst-order conditions of the agents'
optimization problems and the market-clearing conditions of the goods, labor, money
and credit markets.















from the maximization with respect to deposits and
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Wt+1(1   Ht+1)(1   t+1)
(32)
from the maximization with respect to government bonds.
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that are among the equations constituting the solution of the model.
Finally, the FI maximizes its dividends with respect to deposits, which leads to the
following rst order condition:
p
HRFtPt+2Ct+2 = Pt+1Ct+1[(1    )RHt +  R
   p
H(1   )RFt] (36)
As stated above, all markets clear at the equilibrium. The following equations
represent equilibrium in the goods, labor, money, and credit markets, respectively:
Ct + It + Gt + NXt = Yt (37)
Nt = Ht (38)
PtCt = Mt 1 + Xt (39)
Dt + Xt = Lt (40)
NXt denotes net exports, which is equal to the net interest payment on foreign
borrowing minus the change in the amount of foreign borrowing in a given period.
Therefore,
PtNXt = (R
   1)FDt 1Et 1   [FDt 1Et 1   FDtEt] (41)











which constitutes another equation of the solution.





t = 1, which is used to convert the foreign currency denominated foreign
deposits, foreign bond holdings and government bond holdings into domestic currency
in the system of equations.
The model, however, needs to be made stationary rst so that it can be linearized
around the steady-state and that it returns to the steady-state after a shock. The
problem of non-stationarity arises because of having stochastic trends in money and
technology. In the absence of shocks, real variables grow with At (except Nt which
is stationary since there is no population growth), nominal variables grow with Mt
and prices grow with Mt=At. Detrending is carried out as follows (where hats above
variables denote stationarity):
For real variables, ^ qt = qt=At where qt = [Yt;Ct;Kt;It;NXt;Gt]. For nominal vari-
ables, ^ zt = zt=Mt where zt = [Wt;Dt;Lt]. For prices, ^ Pt = PtAt=Mt 1.
The stationary system of equations is as follows:
(1   )(1   Nt)Ltmt = PtCtNt (44)
mtCt+1Pt+1 = RHtCtPt (45)
1
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t Et+1(1   pR
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t = Wtmt (48)
p
HRFtPt+2Ct+2mt+1 = Pt+1Ct+1[(1    )RHt +  R
   p
H(1   )RFt] (49)
Ct + It + Gt + NXt = Yt (50)
PtCt = mt (51)
16DDt
















NXt =  [(R
   1)DDt 1   DDt 1 + DDtmt]=(1    )Pt (56)






























Pt = Et (61)
Given the equations (44)-(61) and the risk premium shock given in (27), the ex-
pected future paths of the variables [Yt, Ct, It, NXt, Pt, DDt, Lt, Nt, Kt, Wt, GBt,
Gt, t, pR
t , Et, RFt, RHt, RGB
t ], namely, the impulse response functions, conditional on
temporary risk premium shocks in period 1 are obtained next.
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3.1 Simulation
The procedure of making the model stationary is followed by linearization and simula-
tion.15 The model is linearized up to rst order.16 The perturbation method employed
to solve and to simulate the model can be summarized as follows: The solution to
the system of equations obtained in the previous section is a set of equations relating
variables in the current period to the past state of the system and current shocks,
that satisfy the original system. These are referred to as "the policy functions". In
the linearization up to rst order, future shocks enter the linearized system of equa-
tions only with their rst moments (which are zero in expectations); therefore, they
drop out when taking expectations of the equations. This is why certainty equivalence
holds in the system linearized up to rst order. The (approximate) policy functions
are obtained by rst rewriting the system in terms of past variables, current and future
shocks, and then linearizing it around the steady states. Impulse response functions are
then acquired simply through iterating the policy functions starting from some initial
values (given by the steady states).17
For simulations, the following values are assigned to the structural parameters of
the model: =0.32, =0.99, =0.76, =0.025, =0.003, =0.7.18 The success proba-
bility of project "bad", pL, is set equal to 0.1. The fraction of the capital stock to be
used as collateral by rms, , is taken to be equal to 0.1, whereas the probability of
death of rm managers, , is set to 0.6. The parameter measuring the private benets
of entrepreneurs from project "bad", PB, is taken as 0.5. The fraction of the debt
on which the government defaults, , is assigned the value 0.7. The tax adjustment
parameter, , is calibrated to 0.99.
15The linearization and the simulation of the model are carried out using DYNARE, which is a
pre-processor and a collection of MATLAB routines that have been developed to support modern
macro modeling.
16In the case of linearization up to the rst order, agents behave as if future shocks were equal to zero
(since their expectation is null), due to certainty equivalence. In the linearization up to second order,
agents make their decisions knowing that the future value of innovations are random but will have
zero mean. This is not the same thing because of Jensen's inequality. For more detailed information,
see DYNARE User Guide.
17The impulse response functions presented in the next section depict the responses of the variables
in terms of deviations from the steady states.
18For the parameter values, Mendoza (1991), Nason and Cogley (1994) and Dib (2003) are followed.
Dib (2003) employs quarterly Canadian data for the calibration and the estimation in his small-open-
economy DSGE model.
183.2 Impulse Response Functions
Figure 1: Temporary Risk Premium Shock (1/2)
Figure 1 displays the impulse response functions of the variables in the model in the
case of a positive, one-time, temporary risk premium shock in period 1.19 The positive
risk premium shock leads directly to an increase in the interest rate on government
bonds, which leads to a contraction in the amount of government bonds supplied by
the government. The risk premium shock also causes an increase in the nominal ex-
change rate; that is, a depreciation in the exchange rate. Due to the fact that the tax
rate growth is proportional to the growth of the total value of the government debt,
according to the simple tax rule followed by the government, the tax rate increases in
response to the risk premium shock. Determined partly by the size of the exchange
rate depreciation and partly by the tax adjustment parameter, the increase in the
government revenue leads consequently to an expansion in government spending.
19The values used in the simulations that lead to the impulse responses presented here are   = 0:9,
R = 1:01, pH = 0:9 and  = 0:99.
19Figure 2: Temporary Risk Premium Shock (2/2)
In response to the rise in the price level, households reduce their consumption. Do-
mestic deposit holdings by households, on the other hand, increase since the supply of
government bonds is lower due to the higher costs of borrowing for the government. As
deposits rise, so do total loans available for rms. However, the increase in the amount
of loans does not consequently lead to an increase in employment, and subsequently
in production, as a result of the rise in the distorting tax rate creating disincentives
to work and thereby causing a fall in the labor supply. Therefore, output also falls in
response to the positive risk premium shock. The fall in output and investment in the
case of a positive risk premium shock conrms in a monetary framework the ndings
of the RBC literature for open economies.20
20See, among others, Uribe (2006a).
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Aggregate uctuations in the case of risk premium shocks are analyzed in this study
for a small open economy. The business cycle in a DSGE framework with nancial and
informational frictions is investigated in response to positive, temporary risk premium
shocks. The risk premium arises in the model due to the existence of a government
sector that borrows domestically with a partial default risk. More specically, in order
to be able to compensate the domestic households, that also have the option of holding
foreign securities, for the default risk involved in the government bonds, the government
oers some risk premium in addition to the international interest rate prevailing for
the foreign bonds. A risk premium shock, therefore, aects the investment decisions of
households in terms of relative asset holdings. It also has implications for government
spending, which is supposed to be nanced through domestic borrowing and taxation.
Risk premium is, by denition, an issue of relevance for emerging economies that
are exposed to risks of default on debt due to their lack of adequately developed nan-
cial and macroeconomic infrastructure. Therefore, the implications of risk premium
shocks for aggregate uctuations are of special importance for emerging economies,
that are also facing nancial frictions. These two crucial aspects of emerging markets;
namely, exposure to default risk and nancial frictions, are combined in this paper
in a DSGE framework with informational frictions and uncertainty in the production
process. Informational asymmetries among the agents in the economy and uncertainty
in the production process necessitate nancial intermediation in the economy. The
Holmstrom-Tirole type of uncertainty in the production process also leads to collater-
alized borrowing by rms, which requires special attention to the design of the loan
contracts between the rms and the nancial intermediaries.
The small-open-economy DSGE model developed in this paper is solved and sim-
ulated in the case of positive, one-time, temporary risk premium shocks. The model
predicts an increase in the interest rate on government bonds and in the nominal ex-
change rate in response to the shock. The depreciation in the exchange rate increases
the value of the government bonds in terms of the domestic currency, which leads to a
rise in the tax rate due to the simple tax rule followed by the government. Determined
partly by the size of the exchange rate depreciation and partly by the tax adjustment
parameter, the increase in the amount of the tax revenue of the government, accompa-
nied by a decrease in the government borrowing due to higher costs of repayment for
the government, leads to an increase in the government spending. In response to the
rise in the price level, households reduce their consumption. Domestic deposit holdings
by households, on the other hand, increase since the supply of government bonds is
lower due to the higher costs of borrowing for the government. As deposits rise, so
do total loans available for rms. However, the increase in the amount of loans does
not consequently lead to an increase in employment, and subsequently in production,
because of the fact that the rise in the distorting tax rate creates disincentives to work
and thereby causes a fall in the labor supply. Therefore, output also falls in response
to the positive risk premium shock.
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